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In January 2013, two 14-year-old girls reported to police that Derrick Hayes and Keosha Jones were forcing them to 
sell sex.1 Jones was in charge of most of the logistics: she advertised the victims’ services on www.backpage.com, 
coordinated meetings between the victims and customers, and collected the $100 to $200 per day that the victims 
earned. She was also instrumental in keeping the girls compliant. One victim told the police that she believed, quite 
simply, that Jones would kill her if she stopped making money.  
 
Hayes and Jones were both charged with human trafficking in federal court, and both pleaded guilty. However, 
there was a significant difference between their sentences: while Hayes got 30 years in prison, Jones was put on 
supervised release. The judge noted that although Jones was, by her own admission, a human trafficker—although 
she had, in stark terms, facilitated the rape of children for money—she was also a victim. Indeed, her initiation into 
the sex industry had taken place when she was just one year older than her own victims and, furthermore, it had 
occurred at the hands of Hayes, her co-conspirator (he beat her, drugged her, and forced her to have sex for 
money). The clear and direct link between Jones’s crime and Hayes’s brutality—along with her willingness to testify 
against Hayes, and her overall commitment to self-reform and rehabilitation—convinced the court to be lenient. 
 
Jones occupied an organisational position well-known to law enforcement officials across the United States: she was, 
in industry terms, Hayes’s ‘bottom girl’. As defined in one federal criminal complaint: 
 
‘Bottom Girl’ is the street term for a woman who sits atop the hierarchy of prostitutes 
working for a particular pimp. A bottom girl is usually the prostitute who has been with the 
pimp the longest and consistently makes the most money. Being the bottom girl gives the 
prostitute status and power over the other women working for the pimp; however the 
bottom girl also bears many responsibilities. In US v. Pipkins, 378 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 
2004), the Eleventh Circuit described the bottom girl’s duties as ‘work[ing] the track in [her 
pimp’s] stead, running interference for and collecting money from the pimp’s other  
prostitutes, [and] look[ing] after the pimp’s affairs if the pimp was out of town, incarcerated, 
or otherwise unavailable’.2 
 
Like many women in this role, Jones had significant responsibilities: for example, she recruited other girls into the 
sex trade, managed day-to-day operations, and delivered all profits (including, notably, those from her own 
commercial sexual activity) to Hayes. In cases (such as Jones’s) in which commercial sex is procured through 
trafficking (i.e. the sex work is performed by minors, or is compelled through force, fraud, or coercion), ‘bottom 
girls’ often occupy two dissonant roles: they are both traffickers and trafficking victims. This presents a vexing legal 
question, one at odds with criminal law’s affinity for clear boundaries between guilt and innocence: how should the 
law treat innocent traffickers, guilty victims?3 
 
The status quo is to prosecute such women as traffickers—usually as co-defendants with the men who have 
allegedly trafficked them. It is tempting to reject this approach out of hand, tempting to object to the underlying 
                                                          
1  See generally US v. Jones, 13-cr-00442 (M.D.Fla.) 
2  Criminal Complaint at 4, United States v. Eric Antwan Bell, 8:12-cr-00124-JSM-EAJ (M.D.Fla., Jan. 3, 2011), ECF No. 1. See also Criminal 
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Indictment, US v. Derwin Samuel Smith at 1, 1:10-cr-00583 (D.Md., Feb. 1, 2011), ECF No. 35 (‘A “bottom girl” is considered to be an 
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3  Common law defences, such as necessity and duress, generally require a threat of immediate harm, and therefore are not applicable to many 
human trafficking situations. 
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premise that trafficking victims have enough self-determination to be guilty of anything, much less voluntary 
acquiescence to their traffickers’ demands. Punishing them seems both unjust as a matter of principle and 
impractical as a matter of policy: people who have no choice but to break the law cannot be deterred, so why 
bother? 
 
One outspoken critic of the prosecutorial approach is Shamere McKenzie, a trafficking survivor and self-identified 
former ‘bottom girl’.4 She has publicly called for the cessation of prosecutions of women in this situation for 
trafficking and related offences, challenging prosecutors to ‘understand that [the] bottom girl is the one who’s the 
most victimized; [that’s] why she’s even in the position…in the first place’.5 In other words, the fact that these 
women have power and status within the organisation is not incompatible with the notion that they are actually 
unable to leave; to the contrary, traffickers can seek to maintain control by strategically meting out power and status 
to those who are most submissive. Though the intuition may be that more participation in the enterprise means 
more actual agency—and thus more grounds for punishment—McKenzie argues that the opposite is actually true. 
 
McKenzie accurately described Keosha Jones’s plight: the intensification of Jones’s involvement with Hayes 
sounded in capitulation, not empowerment. But an analysis of more federal cases against women in these positions 
suggests that McKenzie’s theory cannot be fully generalised. In US v. Robinson, for example, the defendant who was 
a ‘bottom girl’—Anniesha Whitt—allegedly got the male defendant involved in the sex trade; she also exerted 
significant control over their operations.6 Though Whitt and Jones had the same basic job, their different levels of 
actual agency call for different legal responses. 
 
What becomes clear is that there is no single solution to this issue. Some women involved in trafficking operations 
in these ways deserve leniency, like Jones; others are no less autonomous and culpable than traffickers who  
entered the trade voluntarily. But the fact that some people are not guilty of trafficking does not make prosecution 
the wrong approach: to the contrary, it suggests that prosecution is important. A criminal action, with its procedural 
safeguards and fact-intensive inquiry, is the appropriate context within which to make a determination of culpability. 
When women in these positions are on trial, courts must take care to consider voluntariness—and must use their 
discretion to deviate from sentencing guidelines, order treatment, or find other ways of accommodating the ‘unusual 
situation in which the defendant was herself, a victim as well as a perpetrator, of the same types of crimes’.7 
Complexity in such cases in inevitable. The answer is not to avoid prosecution, but rather to use the courtroom as a 
forum for the thorny, fact-specific question of how to treat guilty victims under the law. 
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